On Monday, April 5, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeanne Kirkpatrick, now a senior fellow at the conservative American Enterprise Institute and a professor at Georgetown University, gave an address on her experiences in Ronald Reagan's Administration. Her appearance was part of a series of guest lectures in the Kennedy School of Government Ph.D. candidate Aaron Lobel's IOP study group "Presidential Decision-Making and Foreign Policy." On the following day, Lobel welcomed another important figure from recent Republican administrations, General Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor under Nixon and Bush. 

Each participant shed light upon the creation of foreign policy within their respective administrations, providing an interesting perspective on past presidential actions, while also demonstrating lessons to be applied to the present situation and to the future. 

Dr. Kirkpatrick, whose arrival preceded the previously unannounced creation of the Jeanne Kirkpatrick Professorship of International Affairs at the Kennedy School, focused the bulk of her attention upon Ronald Reagan as an individual. She recalled that the 40th President was presented with a world in which U.S. war planes couldn't fly, Americans were full of self-doubt and uncertainty, and Soviet power was at an all-time high. Given our current prosperity and the end of the Cold War, Kirkpatrick suggested that Reaganís impact has been so great that few people can even remember what the world looked like before his presidency.

She contended that Reagan's idealism not only aided his ability to create clearly-defined successful policies, but also enhanced his clairvoyance.  Reagan, she said.  was the "only person I know that was not surprised by the implosion of the Soviet Union."  Reagan's attempts to portray the Cold War as winnable and the United States and the Soviet Union as players in a Manichean struggle were often contrary to the wishes of his advisors. His characterization of the Soviet Union as the "evil empire," while a position which Kirkpatrick says she shared with her colleagues, was hardly a sentiment considered appropriate for public expression. Yet Kirkpatrick credits Reagan's ability to trust his own inclinations and to overrule his advisors for the success of American foreign policy in the 1980s.

Reagan's methods for achieving his goals have gained such acclaim that they are now referred to as the Reagan Doctrine, a policy of supplying military aid to rebellious peoples who seek to free themselves from the oppression of totalitarian regimes, rather than placing U.S. troops in jeopardy. Kirkpatrick continued, "The Reagan Doctrine was such a new idea that it took a long time to even name it." Indeed, Reagan would only use force in situations where, according to Kirkpatrick, American interests were being aggressively challenged. She also noted that Reagan would not use force except with the support of Congress and the country. Equally important, she contended, any use of force necessitated the existence of a clearly defined end and the presence of overwhelming force, as exemplified by the U.S. military action in Grenada.

When asked to apply Reagan's policy and her own views to the current state of international affairs, Kirkpatrick was hesitant to offer any quick solutions to the present problems in Iraq and Kosovo. However, she did say that she believes, if Ronald Reagan were President in 1991, he would have continued the U.S. assault against Iraq by sending U.S. troops into Baghdad to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein. Yet she also suggested that she did not intend her comments to be a criticism of President Bush, merely that President Reagan might have taken a different approach. Regarding current military action in Kosovo, Kirkpatrick, likely wishing to avoid criticism of an ongoing operation in which American lives are at stake, limited her comments by saying, "We all worry about whether the President is competent with the use of force."

On Tuesday, April 6, General Brent Scowcroft, President Bush's National Security Advisor during the 1991 Gulf War, sharply repudiated Kirkpatrick's insinuation that U.S. forces should have deposed Saddam Hussein. Asked if pushing on to Baghdad was a serious option, Scowcroft replied, "Of course we thought about it...[but] it wasnít a serious option...for several reasons. Finding Saddam Hussein would have been impossible. But we could have overthrown the regime." However, even commencing such a maneuver would not have been prudent, according to the Bush administration official.  They could not predict events if goals were changed during the mission - the coalition might not have survived, and the Middle East peace process could have been derailed. Fortunately, Scowcroft explained, American foreign policy was always formulated with an eye towards establishing a post-war order.

Scowcroft, unlike Kirkpatrick, applied the lessons of serving in multiple administrations to current international problems. Like Reagan, President Bush, "when he was elected President, knew what he wanted to do." As a former diplomat in China and CIA director, Bush had plenty of foreign policy experience. 

While Scowcroft attributes Bush's approach to his international affairs expertise, rather than an underlying philosophy, Bush also was resolute about maintaining a clear foreign policy. "Once he had made a decision, it was done," Scowcroft said of his former boss. 

Bush also wished to communicate his views to allies and adversaries. He stressed the importance of letting the world know where the President of the United States stood. President Bush would frequently call foreign leaders on the telephone, often for personal, not professional, reasons - behavior quite rare among heads of state. It enabled him to corral support among our allies, including his amazing ability to prevent massive Latin American opposition to the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989, because Bush had explained his purpose to foreign leaders prior to commencing military action. Scowcroft asserted that this was a "marvelous system...to have our friends understand where we were coming from." 

Bush's clarity of purpose also was an asset in dealing with Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, with whom Bush communicated U.S. openness to reducing tensions and a desire for gradual liberalization of the communist world. Scowcroft credits this to Bush's "keen sense about people" which enabled him to discern Gorbachev's status as a reformer who could work with the West. Finally, Scowcroft concluded that "He made the Cold War's end seem so inevitable that it's hard to think it could have come out any other way." 

However, Scowcroft thinks that our policy-experts have learned some poor lessons from the major conflict of the Bush administration's tenure. "I think there is a siren song aspect to aerial bombing...clean, neat, easy...Unfortunately, it doesn't have great record for making leaders change their mind," he said. He also noted that ground troops were necessary to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait, even after 30 days of bombing. Scowcroft directly criticized President Clinton for relying on successful bombing in Bosnia in 1995 as an example of limited air strikes leading to a cease-fire, while conveniently omitting reference to a massive ground offensive which was occurring simultaneously. Clinton ìdoesnít want to do something that offends the American peopleî such as the introduction of ground troops, but Scowcroft fervently beliefs that an air war alone will not work. "If we're serious, we'll end up putting in ground troops...we're heading in that direction," he added. 

The former National Security Advisor also estimated that it would take approximately two months to prepare for a land attack. However, Scowcroft cautions, "the record of the Serbs' ability to endure pain and suffering is centuries old." He reluctantly supports action to prevent a potential spillover to Macedonia, about which he says Greece is "paranoid." In such a situation, Turkey would likely align with their religious allies, the Albanians, while Bulgaria believes that Macedonia actually belongs to Bulgaria itself. Clearly, as Scowcroft put it, "there are no good answers."

Kirkpatrick's analysis of Reagan administration policy suggests that any foreign action should have a clearly defined goal and should be conducted with the "preponderance of force." Scowcroft also proclaims that successful military commitments involve careful planning, the development of a well-coordinated strategy, and a clear enunciation of U.S. policy and objectives. This approach also requires administration officials to possess clearly defined goals and to be prepared to use a level of military force proportional to achieving the stated objectives. This cannot be achieved  through  a  limited  number  of bombing sorties against a determined foe. 

According to Reagan's doctrine of support for freedom and individualism around the globe, we have a duty to support the desire of the Albanian Kosovars to achieve their independence from Serbia without suffering persecution. In order to provide peace, security, and freedom in the region, we must act resolutely. However, the lessons from the past two Republican administrations, both of which had highly successful foreign policies, also indicate that there a number of considerations are required if NATO is to prevail.

We must have a clearly defined mission, which should be the liberation of Kosovo from Serbian domination, and we must be prepared to accomplish this mission. This will require a fundamental commitment to use as much force as necessary. As General Scowcroft concluded from his Gulf War experience, this will require the introduction of ground troops, a situation which may not be popular with the American people. It is President Clinton's duty to clearly articulate our goal of delivering the right of self-determination to the Kosovar people. Only then will he be able to properly rally American support for the necessary land assault. It will also be the only opportunity to firmly communicate American resolve to Mr. Milosevic. 

By learning from the success of previous administrations, hope- fully Clinton will develop the fortitude to properly accomplish this mission. Unfortunately, with a President who once said he loathed the military, and whose capabilities as commander-in-chief are questioned even by the extremely diplomatic Kirkpatrick, this hardly seems likely. We may need to wait two years before seeing an administration which is prepared to assume America's role as the world's dominant superpower.