At Harvard

At Harvard: Campus Affairs


The Ties that Bind

Harvard and the Corporate World

By Jeff Pooley

Imagine Harvard researchers sharing research facilities with pharmaceutical firms while granting those corporations exclusive patent rights to medical advances financed by taxpayers. This seems ethically obscene, a sacrifice of scientific integrity to the interests of profit. Harvard's Institutes of Medicine apparently has no such qualms, and is going ahead with a new ten-story research center, four floors of which are reserved for private, corporate use. These lucky corporate tenants, who can expect lucrative returns that far exceed their investment, will pay only a portion of the university's research costs. The rest will be picked up by Harvard and the federal government, which currently provides $350 million of the Medical School's $600 million budget.

While centers of higher learning across the country have embraced corporate funding in a scramble for money, Harvard seems bent on elevating the practice to an art. The beauty of the research center is that everybody profits--except the public. Highly profitable drug companies enjoy the fruits of research at a vastly reduced price, along with the legitimacy granted by the supposedly objective academy. Harvard rakes in corporate subsidies and the potential millions that could be realized through licensing new drugs. The researchers themselves profit handsomely through their cut of the licensing royalties, their opportunity to become equity holders in the corporations, and potential consulting fees. The only losers are U.S. taxpayers, who unknowingly subsidize corporate America's profits.

Knowledge for Sale

This corporate appendage to the Medical School is by no means an anomaly, as Lawrence Soley details in the well-documented Leasing the Ivory Tower (South End Press, 1995). Businesses never pass up a good deal, and they have eagerly forged ties with universities through biomedical research, consulting, and the Business School that, in many cases, have reduced the pursuit of knowledge to the service of profit. The passage of two key bills, the 1980 Small Business Patent Procedures Act (extended to large companies by executive order) and the 1981 Recovery Tax Law, allowed universities to license patents, and increased tax deductions for `corporate donations' to higher education, respectively. These two laws spurred university patents to rise from 619 in 1986 to 1,145 in 1989. Not coincidentally, corporate money donated for research mushroomed from $235 million in 1980 to $1.2 billion in 1991, a solid indication that businesses view these "gifts" as sound investments.

While this influx of corporate dollars has not been directed exclusively at Harvard, many of the tentative steps and `innovations' in this new cooperation were made in the name of Veritas. Harvard often boasts of its independence, but this claim rings hollow when large parts of the university are contractually beholden to the private sector. Vice president William Grala of the corporate giant, Smith-Kline Beechman, acknowledges that his company's academic funding is intended for "the preservation of the system" and to "strengthen democratic capitalism." Although most corporate donors would not so brazenly admit to an ideological agenda, Grala's frankness is telling.

As if the rapacious profiteering of billion-dollar corporations weren't disturbing enough, the university-business alliance has and may continue to influence both the direction and the published results of research. The creeping influence of corporate dollars is perhaps felt most strongly in biomedical research, as detailed in Soley's work and John Trumpbour's essay "The Business-University Revisited: Industry and Empire in Crimson Cambridge." Always on the cutting edge, Harvard helped pioneer the practice of essentially selling research, a fateful innovation that surely lent much of the credibility needed to spur university-corporate relationships all over the country. "Harvard's example of signing these large contracts quickly spread to other universities on the East Coast," notes Martin Kenney.

In an arrangement described as "unprecedented in the annals of academic business affairs" by Science magazine, the Medical School entered into a twelve-year contract with Monsanto in 1974 that gave the drug giant the right to an exclusive worldwide license if it were to develop tumor-fighting drugs in exchange for $23.5 million. Trumpbour notes that by 1989 Harvard-affiliated Massachusetts General Hospital had entered into 40 to 50 contracts with corporations, including an $85 million contract with Japan's Shiseido Corporation to found a research center devoted to finding baldness remedies, anti-wrinkle creams, and suntanning lotions.

More recently, Sandoz Pharmaceuticals received the rights to a potentially hugely profitable treatment for colon cancer funded in large part by the federal government, even though no Sandoz money was used in the research. Sandoz had struck a $100 million, 10-year deal with the Harvard-affiliated Dana Farber Institute in 1992 that promised the company exclusive rights to any discovery made by any researcher who had accepted Sandoz funds. One of the researchers had received Sandoz money for another project; the fact that none was spent on the colon cancer discovery didn't matter.

Researchers in Search of Profit

Apparently not content with the relatively paltry returns of corporate agreements, Harvard has decided to try direct commercial involvement. In 1988 Harvard created the Medical Science Partners, a venture capital fund meant to invest in faculty biomedical projects, that leaves Harvard with a direct "role and interest in the marketing of its faculty's research," in the words of Jaron Bourke. This is another innovation sure to be reproduced in other institutions.

According to a Science article, close to 20% of Harvard biomedical professors have ties to corporations through stock ownership, consulting work, or speaking fees. Biochemist Mark Ptashne, for instance, made millions investing in the biotechnology firm Genentech, Inc. The injection of money into academic research has fostered outright fraud at Harvard in more than one instance. Dr. Scheffer Tseng and his supervisor Kenneth Kenyon, in one example, found Spectra Pharmaceutical Service's vitamin A ointment ineffective in tests. When Spectra went public in 1985, Tseng and Kenyon, both large stockholders, attempted to cover up the ointment's ineffectiveness by, among other methods, altering their placebo and secretly treating patients with additional drugs. Their real results were kept hidden until after Tseng and his family made over $1 million from selling Spectra stock, according to The Boston Globe.

Despite new Harvard policies that prohibit stock ownership or consulting while engaged in clinical trials, the divergence between the aims of science and business has resulted in other skewed research findings, some stretched and some openly fraudulent, notes Troupdour. According to The Boston Globe, the Harvard-dominated Cambridge BioScience corporation attempted to cover up data that revealed the low ranking of its AIDS blood test at the Fourth International AIDS conference in 1988. When Harvard biologist Walter Gilbert publicly announced that his company, Biogen, was the first to produce interferon in 1980 as a possible cure for cancer, Biogen's parent company's stock shot up; just months later the drug's effects were discredited by the American Association for Cancer Research.

Exceptions only highlight the grim rule. Nobel Prize-winning scientist Cesar Mistein, in an act of courageous defiance, recently refused to patent a major discovery expected to produce a billion-dollar market: "A patent would have meant keeping everything secret while we thought about applications--an outrageous insult to science. Patents are an intellectual swindle." Sadly, few scientists or universities share his perception.

Corporate Touts at the B-School

While it's hardly surprising that corporate influence is rampant at the Business School, the sheer strength of the bond is striking. Trumpbour notes that the school "produces the field marshals--and the field manuals--that guide finance and industry." Twenty-seven of the Fortune 500 companies have a HBS faculty member on their boards, nearly four times the number of directorships held by the next-most influential faculty. With direct participation, paid advice, and publications, the faculty strongly influences the corporate world; business returns the favor through the immense contribution of consulting to professor incomes, and through the effects this dependency has on research results. Required to disclose his personal finances in 1989 before joining the Bush Administration, finance professor Robert R. Glauber provided a glimpse of the size of consulting fees: Glauber's non-investment income in 1988 was $874,445, including $515,750 in consulting fees and a scant $120,000 in Harvard salary.

Paid advice and research is a P.R. bonanza for corporations: "Professors who are funded by industries like the tobacco industry have money to travel to conferences, to do research, to get it published, and the industries make sure views friendly to them get circulated," notes Richard Pollay, a marketing professor at the University of British Columbia. "Views that aren't friendly to industry don't get funded." Substantial recent evidence supports Pollay's contention, including the $3.5 million dished out in one year by AT&T for research and testimony to professors across the country. By depending on the very topic of study for funding, business schools make sure that no critical scholarship will be able to filter through.

Whither Harvard? More of the Same

An institution with a mammoth $6 billion portfolio and whose two governing bodies are increasingly made up of representatives of corporate America can hardly be expected to shake the pillars of capitalism. Although the university likes to distance itself symbolically from of corporate attachment (e.g, instead of being the Polaroid Center, the Science Center is built in the shape of a camera), Harvard's efforts are contradicted by moves like actively opposing unionization efforts by the Harvard Union of Clerical and Technical Workers. Harvard, in typical fashion, opposed a shareholder resolution requesting American Cyanamid's public disclosure of potential chemical hazards in the wake of a major disaster in India. The university owned $8.5 million in stock at the time. As Trumpbour writes, "When it came time to support a mild proposal designed to inform workers of the chemicals at their workplace, Harvard's vaunted commitment to humanism and the free marketplace of ideas suddenly did not apply."

Chase Peterson, the College's former Dean of Admissions, emphasizes that he believes in "what the students are calling our monstrous corporate state, because it keeps America alive and the colleges should be turning out students who can staff it." Peterson's comments are only startling in their honesty, but there's little doubt that Harvard has fulfilled his goal. Harvard has been a widely recognized training center for elites and their lackeys. Many alums' unflinching and devoted service in the CIA and State Department has ensured that nothing (like Third World democracy) gets in the way of the American system and favorable business climates. When the next wave of investment bankers, corporate executives, foreign servants, journalists, and politicians graduates this year, Harvard will likely remain cheerfully complicit in upholding the status quo.