The Emerging Illiberal Majority

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John Judis and Ruy Teixiera's The Emerging Democratic Majority is a cleverly-named book. They consciously allude to the prescient Kevin Phillips book of 1969, The Emerging Republican Majority, and they avoid the mistake of incorrectly titling the book The Emerging Liberal Majority. Teixeira and Judis argue that the Democratic Party cannot lead this country back to the left but should instead take this opportunity to capture the center. As the New Deal coalition collapsed when the Democratic Party's support of the civil rights movement alienated southern voters and the party's inability to handle stagflation alienated blue-collar "Reagan Democrats," so will the Republican majority collapse under the weight of its religious fundamentalism, its knee-jerk conservatism, and the perception that it is beholden to large corporations.

A centrist Democratic Party will be able win the fastest-growing and most dynamic segments of post-industrial, multi-racial America: professionals, minorities, and women. Professionals were historically a bastion of Republicanism, identifying themselves with the party's emphasis on "law and order" and big business. Starting with McGovern's campaign in 1972, professionals have increasingly distanced themselves from the interests of managers. Professionals--doctors, nurses, teachers, lawyers, etc.--due to the general liberalizing effect of a college education are generally supportive of the environmental, consumer protection, and political reform movements; they are the most supportive of civil rights of any occupational group. The Republican Party, however, has increasingly established itself as the opponent to real environmental, consumer, and civil rights reforms. In 2000, a strong majority of professionals voted for Gore while a strong majority of managers voted for Bush.

Teixeira and Judis also argue that minorities will continue their trend of supporting the Democratic Party. A majority of African-, Asian-, and Latino-Americans all, to a greater or lesser degree, voted for Gore in 2000, and these minorities comprise an increasingly larger percentages of the population and the electorate. Moreover, the authors claim that even sub-groups of these minorities who vote Republican--Cuban- and Japanese-Americans for example--show trends of turning towards the Democratic Party. However, there is much danger is extrapolating voting trends from demographic ones. The Democratic Party can easily alienate one or all of these groups if, in its attempt to seize to dominate the center, a perception develops that the party has abandoned minorities in an attempt to get white middle- and working-class votes.

Finally, women have become the single most important segment of the Democratic Party's electorate. Although Democrats often support restrictions on reproductive freedom, they have always defended a woman's fundamental right to choose from persistent right-wing attacks. Given the increasing professionalization of women and strong support for abortion, it is easy to see why women have become consistent supporters of the Democratic Party. The percentage by which the Democratic Party won the women's vote in 2000 matched the percentage by which the party lost the men's vote. As more women become professionals and as reproductive rights come under even greater attack, more women will flock to the Democratic Party.

Another key development in the Democratic consensus is that of the "ideopolis." These post-industrial urban areas (such as San Francisco and Chicago) have moved away from producing goods and towards producing ideas. "Ideopolises" overwhelmingly vote Democratic. For example, the Chicago metropolitan area voted 80 percent to 17 percent in favor of Al Gore. The key is that in diverse "ideopolises" even working-class whites reject the race-baiting tactics of the Republican Party and vote alongside blacks. The "ideopolis" is important not only because its development solidifies the Democratic hold on professionals and minorities, but also it helps the Democratic Party gain voters among the working-class whites that have been the Republican Party's strength since the 1970s.

While the Republican realignment in the 70s and 80s represented an ideological shift to the right, the Democratic realignment that Teixeira and Judis describe will not be an ideological swing back to the left. Rather, it will entail the Democratic Party adopting a platform of "progressive centrism" and seizing the moderate votes. Progressive centrists want the government to "steer, not row" the market and protect them from its abuses. Quotas, redistributive taxation, and other "excessively liberal" programs go too far for the progressive centrist, but government regulations about corporate malfeasance, discrimination, and the environment are fine. Living in the diverse "ideopolis," the emerging voters have little sympathy for the race baiting of the Republican Party, but neither do they have sympathy for bra-burning radical feminists. They generally do not like regressive tax cuts, but neither are they fans of high progressive taxation. The Democratic majority will not be a liberal majority, even in a best-case scenario where all the demographic trends follow the lines set out by Teixeira and Judis.

Of course that is just fine with Teixeira and Judis, who have their own ideological axe to grind. To them, the "excesses" of liberals during the 60s and 70s led to a justifiable voter backlash in the 80s. This passage is particularly illuminating: "The civil rights movement had become identified with ghetto riots and busing; feminism with bra burning and lesbians; the antiwar movement with appeasement of third world radicals and the Soviet Union; and liberal Democrats with grandiose schemes that were supposed to stimulate the economy but that would increase taxes for the white middle class and only benefit the poor and minorities. As long as these partly justifiable stereotypes endured, Republicans were able to win elections easily." (Emphasis mine.) It is hard to see what exactly is "partly justifiable" about these stereotypes, and it seems that Teixiera and Judis may be influenced by their perception that liberalism is bankrupt and dead. In any case, the answer for them is Clintonian or progressive centrism and repudiating the "grandiose" social engineering schemes of the Great Society. Nader's help in electing Bush (Nader plus Gore equaled over 51 percent of the vote in 2000) will scare liberals into voting for the centrist candidate. This illustrates only too well the electoral dilemma that liberals are faced with every election year: either vote for a party that takes you for granted as it rushes to the middle, or risk the genuine gains made in the areas environment, reproductive rights, and others by voting for a party that has no realistic chance of winning and opposing Republican initiatives. Teixeira and Judis are banking on liberals choosing the former. The centrist Democratic Leadership Council figures much more prominently in the book than any liberal organization as the path to a majority coalition. In this new majority, liberals will find themselves shunted to the side as the "progressive centrists" dominate the Democratic agenda.

The Republican Party can stave off this majority for a few years by remaining the party of patriotism. Bush's perceived effectiveness in dealing with terrorist attacks and defeating the Taliban has given the Republican Party an artificial boost that cannot last unless Bush and his cronies can move from one dramatic victory to another. The Emerging Democratic Majority lends fresh weight to the claim that Bush's warmongering is dictated by electoral math, and the successes of the GOP during the midterm elections illustrate this point well. For the moment, however, the moral and elective imperatives to oppose Bush's unilateral adventures abroad converge; there should be no question that the survival of the Democratic party depends on an effective opposition to Bush and the Republican Party's jingoism.

Questions? Comments? Please contact perspy@hcs.harvard.edu